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Abstract This study addresses the productivity of Dutch hos-
pitals since the start of the health systems reform in 2005. We
consider DEA based measures, which include efficiency and
quality for the complete set of Dutch hospitals and present
cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis. In particular, we
consider how hospital efficiency has developed. As the reform
created an environment of regulated competition, we pay spe-
cial attention to relative efficiency. Our results suggest that the
differences in efficiency among hospitals have become larger.
In the years 2009–2010, the number of hospitals identified as
(close to) efficient by DEA analysis decreased.
Keywords Hospitals . Productivity . Data envelopment
analysis . Malmquist index . Quality indicators .
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1 Introduction
At the turn of the millennium, The Netherlands used a closed
budgeting system for hospital reimbursement, which was pri-
marily based on hospital wide production parameters. This
system was viewed to be supply driven [1] and health insur-
ance companies had little influence on the hospital budget.
Under this closed budgeting system, the combination of strict
macro budgeting and consistent demand increases caused
allocation problems and long waiting lists [2].
The 2005 health system reformed relied on market princi-
ples, which created an environment of regulated competition
for hospitals [3]. As a result of the reform, health insurers and
hospitals freely negotiated prices, volumes and quality for a
subset of the health services, which was defined between all
stakeholders on a national level. The first year, 2005 can be
seen as a transition year in which technological implementa-
tion was completed, and public insurance funds disappeared.
The freely negotiable services accounted for approximately
10 % of hospital budgets for 2005, 2006 and 2007. This
percentage rose to 20 % in 2008 and 33 % in 2009. For
most other services the price was set by the National Health
Authority (NZa).
The system reformwas intended to result in a more demand
oriented system in which hospitals delivered higher quality at
lower prices [4], i.e., to make hospitals more cost effective [5].
Below we generally refer to the combination of efficiency and
quality as performance, and we will define it in detail in the
methods section.
The reform not only comprised of a change in reimburse-
ment but also included regulations on public reporting, and
supervision of quality by the Health Care Inspectorate IGZ
[6]. Some evidence suggests that public reporting is effective
as an improvement policy for hospital performance [7]. There
is however little evidence regarding the effects of regulated
competition in combination with public reporting (or relation-
ship) on hospital performance, or more generally the relation-
ship between these constructs. This holds particularly true for
Dutch hospitals, and the recent health reform.
In this study, we explicitly aim to study how the perfor-
mance of Dutch hospitals has developed since the reform of
2005 which introduced regulated competition and public
reporting in The Netherlands. We explore three research ques-
tions of which the first addresses overall, average, performance
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developments, and the remaining two address relative hospital
performances:
1. How has the overall performance of Dutch hospitals
developed?
2. How have the relative performances developed since
2005?
3. How have less efficient hospitals fared?
The first of this research question addresses the perfor-
mances of all hospitals and is primarily of a longitudinal na-
ture. The second and third question clearly also have a cross-
sectional dimension.
The research can also be viewed to study the health ser-
vices procurement practices of the insurers. As a result of the
reform, the insurers have been given the responsibility to ar-
range cost reduction and quality improvements for an increas-
ing fraction of the hospital services through their purchasing
practices. The study provides insights in the achievements of
the insurers. More generally, it is the first DEA study, which
presents a longitudinal and cross sectional analysis of hospital
performance in The Netherlands in the first 6 years of the
reform. The study considers various models to provide robust
answers to the research questions formulated above.
2 Background
Recent studies for the Netherlands regard various aspects of
Dutch hospital performance. Blank et al. [8] explore the pro-
ductivity of Dutch Hospitals over the period 2003–2009, with-
out explicitly taking the reform into account. They conclude
after estimating cost-functions per hospital that productivity
has increased by 14,7% over this 7-year period. They find that
scale effects contribute negatively to the productivity growth,
and that the relative performance has been stable. They attri-
bute the productivity growth to technological, institutional and
societal changes. Ludwig et al. [9] use stochastic frontier anal-
ysis on 1998–2002 data – prior to the reform - to study prin-
cipal agent relationships and efficiency. They conclude that
increasing efficiency does not seem to reduce quality, al-
though no relationship was found between the efficiency
of departments and the efficiency of the entire hospital.
Douven et al. [10] explore the effect of the introduction of
managed competition in Dutch inpatient hospital care.
Interviewing board members of hospitals, these members
suggested the way to raise turnover is to increase produc-
tion. Bijlsma et al. [11] estimate a bivariate model to con-
sider the relationship between the reform and quality im-
provement. They find that competition explains differences
in performance on process indicators, but not on outcome indi-
cators. Further information regarding health services provided
by Dutch hospitals can be found in the yearly reports of The
Dutch Healthcare Authorities [12, 13].
Across the Dutch borders, several authors have addressed
research questions regarding the relationship between reforms
and performance which are akin to the research questions pose
above using DEA models. Maniadakis [14] evaluate the first
5 years of the reforms in the UKNational Health Service in the
early nineties focusing on acute hospitals. Their findings ‘in-
dicate that there was a productivity slowdown in the first year
after the reforms but productivity progress in the subsequent
years’ resulting in net productivity gain. This gain was mostly
attributed to technological change rather than relative efficien-
cy changes. After the first year, they even report a ‘small
relative efficiency regress’. Incorporating quality diminished
the effects. As is the case for our study, Maniadakis [14] relied
on data since the start of the reform.
Other authors have been able to apply a before-after design.
Sommersguter-Reichmann [15] evaluates the 1997 Austrian
hospital financing reform, using DEA analysis, in particular
the Malmquist index. She finds ‘a considerably positive shift
in technology between 1996 and 1998 whereas the intended
enhancement in technical efficiency has not yet taken
place.’ De Castro Lobo [16] consider performance and
productivity changes of Brazilian hospitals in the years
2003–2006, in analysis of the 2004 financing reform.
Contrary to Sommersguter-Reichmann [15] they find indi-
cations that the financing reform provided improvement in
the technical efficiency, although the technological frontier
has not presented a positive shift.
Finally, Ozcan & Luke [17] studying a reconfiguration of
the network of the hospitals of the Veterans Health
Administration in the USA. These authors too rely on DEA
and Malmquist indices and find indications that the reconfig-
uration resulted in ‘improvements in overall productivity’ but
‘didn’t produce changes in efficiency’.
3 Methods
As the reform has been introduced without distinguishing an
intervention group (of hospitals) and a control group (see for
instance Hibbard et al. [7] and Lindenauer et al. [18]), and
systematic reporting of the required indicators was introduced
as part of the reform, we can neither apply a case control
design nor a before after design. We therefore rely on a re-
search design where we consider the performance develop-
ments over the years 2005–2010, particularly paying attention
to performance differences between consecutive years.
Following the references in the background section, we
select a standard approach for performance analysis called
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is commonly ap-
plied in health care, as can be concluded from the review of
Hollingsworth [19] who considers 317 efficiency studies,
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among which 99 are DEA based studies on hospital efficiency
(see also Ozcan, [20] and O’ Neill et al. [21]). Since the
seminal work on DEA of Charnes et al. [22], it has been
repeatedly applied to address the results of hospitals
after reform (see for instances Maniadakis et al. [14],
Sommersgutter-Reichman [15], De Castro Lobo et al. [16]
and Ozcan & Luke [17]).
DEA enables both cross-sectional as well as longitudinal
analysis, as befitting our research questions. The longitudinal
researchers often use the Malmquist Index (see e.g., [20]),
which considers the relative performance improvement
between consecutive periods. The Malmquist index has
been widely applied to study hospital performance (see e.g.,
the literature in the background section).
3.1 Data envelopment analysis
DEA formulates efficiency measurement as a linear pro-
gramming problem. Informally speaking, it solves the
problem of measuring performance of each unit in the
benchmark set in terms of outputs per inputs, relative to
the other units. It explicitly enforces the weighted sum of
the outputs to be less than or equal to one (there cannot
be more output than input).
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≤ 1 for all k; ð1Þ
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Where αi; β j are the weights of the inputs xik ; resp, outputs
y jk , of hospital k. The efficiency of hospital o is now defined
by setting the weights such that the fraction of outputs per









Thus, the problem of determining the efficiency of a hos-
pital is to select weights which maximize (3), subject to (1)
and (2). The set of hospitals for which the objective function
attains the maximum value of one define the efficiency frontier
which ‘envelops’ the less efficient organizations, whose ineffi-
ciency expresses the distance to the frontier [14]. Hospitals on
the frontier are often referred to as ‘efficient’.
We now firstly describe the research methods to answer the
first research question, and address the methods to answer the
other two research questions on this basis.
3.2 Malmquist index
The Malmquist Index (MI) considers the relative performance
improvement between consecutive periods as follows. To for-
mally define the Malmquist Index (MI), let xtik define the
values of the inputs in year t, and ytjk the values of the outputs
in year t as before. Let P(u,v) be the problem arising when
benchmarking the performance of hospital o in year u against
the benchmark set of all hospitals from year v. It can formally be
defined by taking xuik and y
u
jk in the objective function (3) and
formulate constraint (1) using xvik and y
v
jk . Then the Malmquist
index MI is defined as:
MI ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
P t þ 1; tð Þ
P t; tð Þ
P t þ 1; t þ 1ð Þ
P t; t þ 1ð Þ
s
Thus it determines the change in performance of hospital o
from year t to t+1 as the geometric means of the benchmark of
the year t efficiency frontier and the benchmark of the
year t+1 efficiency frontier. The MI is greater than one
if and only if the relative performance of hospital o has
improved from year t to year t+1. This Malmquist index
serves as our prime measure for the development of hos-
pital performance. As we are interested in the performance
development of Dutch hospitals in general, we report for
each pair of consecutive years, the Malmquist index aver-
aged over all hospitals.
The MI especially allows providing insight in the develop-
ment of the efficiency frontier over time, after first rewriting it
as follows:
MI ¼ P t þ 1; t þ 1ð Þ
P t; tð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
P t þ 1; tð Þ
P t þ 1; t þ 1ð Þ
P t; tð Þ
P t; t þ 1ð Þ
s
The first term in this equation is simply the efficiency of
hospital o in year t+1, divided by its efficiency in year t. This
relative improvement of hospital o against the benchmark is
commonly referred to as the efficiency change. The second
term expresses how the efficiency frontier has developed tak-
ing hospital o as a reference and is commonly referred to as the
technology change [20]. We explore the performance im-
provement of efficient hospitals over the years by considering
the subsequent average technology changes.
3.3 Choice of DEA model
Before addressing the methods to answers research questions
2 and 3, we first address a number of methodological issues
regarding the choice DEA model. The first issue is about the
orientation of the DEAmodel. Input oriented models consider
the minimization of inputs for a given level of outputs. Output
oriented models maximize the level of outputs for a given
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level of inputs (See for a further discussion for instance [14,
20]). The same hospitals will appear as efficient under both
orientations, but the efficiency scores of the inefficient hospi-
tals are different. As the aim of the reform has been to provide
the necessary services efficiently, i.e., to deliver the required
output with less input, rather than to increase output, the input
orientedmodel best fits the nature of the reform. This choice is
in agreement with the preference for input oriented models
from the viewpoint of cost control [21]. Hence, the remainder
of the analysis is based on the input oriented model.
A more fundamental issue concerns hospital scale.
Constant returns to scale (CRS) models assume a constant rate
of substitution between inputs and outputs [20]. In this case,
the size of the hospitals is assumed to have no effect on per-
formance. In other words, the productivity function is as-
sumed to be a linear function. Variable returns to scale models
(VRS) assume that scale effects take place. Of course, it is
common to assume that initially positive returns to scale exist,
whereas at some point negative returns to scale may apply. In
DEA models, this can be modeled using piecewise linear pro-
duction functions. As the reform doesn’t consider scale effects
but instead aims to improve prices and quality regardless of
scale, we firstly consider a CRS model. To explore the sensi-
tivity of our results with regard to scale effects, we also present
results for a VRS model.
DEA assumes perfect substitution between inputs and be-
tween outputs. Hence, it assumes that an optimal mix of dif-
ferent inputs or outputs can be attained for instance while
freely substituting between capital and labor as inputs [23].
Thus, DEA is less suitable if inputs cannot replace each other.
Barnum [24] proposes alternative models, which are called
fixed factor models. Regarding hospital performance, we rec-
ognize that the substitution of technology for labor is possible
and hence takes place. At the same time human resources need
buildings and equipment to work by and hence these inputs
are correlated rather than perfectly substitutable. Our research
doesn’t methodologically address the modeling of substitu-
tion. However, in order to establish the sensitivity of the re-
sults for the choice of model we also present efficiency scores
for a fixed proportion ratio model (FPR) [24] and present
results on the correlations of the efficiency scores found by
the DEA and the FPR models.
3.4 Quality
Historically, DEA has been primarily applied to benchmark
efficiency, whereas the health reform not only intended to
improve efficiency, but also to increase quality. This quality
has beenmeasured in terms of structure, process, and outcome
measures [25, 26] by for instance the Dutch Health
Inspectorate IGZ. As DEA models disregards the structures
and processes by which production takes place, only outcome
measures can be included in models, provided that they can be
suitably quantified to be incorporated in the outputs. O’ Neill
et al. [21] provide examples of the limited number of DEA
papers, which have included quality measures. The outcome
measures, which are defined hospital wide and collected con-
sistently over the period 2005–2010 are taken into account in
the analysis presented below.
3.5 Efficiency classes and market exit
The first research question can be answered using the methods
presented above and considering the efficiency frontier and
average hospital performances from 2005 to 2010. The second
and third research question requires a more detailed analysis
of individual hospital performances. DEA methods qualify a
hospital as efficient if its efficiency score equals 1. For the
purpose of presentation (and without claiming any theoretical
interpretation), we have chosen to specify efficiency classes
per first digit of the efficiency score. The first class includes
the efficient hospitals, the second class includes the hospitals
with an efficiency score ranging from 0,9 to 1, a third class
with hospitals having efficiency scores from 0,8 to 0,9 et
cetera. A hospital can change class from year to year.
To answer the third research question we especially pay
attention to hospitals in the lower classes. As low efficiency
may indicate high costs levels and/or low quality, a low effi-
ciency score may indicate a less favorable position on the mar-
ket. Hence, we pay special in the analysis to low scores. This
brings about a methodological difficulty however, as we only
include hospitals for which we have data for each of the years
2005–2010. Hospitals, which have exited the market are there-
fore not included, potentially resulting in a biased answer.
We have analyzed the efficiency scores of all hospitals,
which have exited the market over the years 2005–2010. In
all cases, this has led to a merger or acquisition, and we pres-
ent efficiency scores before and after the merger whenever
possible. As the hospitals involved in mergers or acquisition
have by definition not consistently reported efficiency and
quality over the years 2005–2010, they are excluded from
the DEA benchmark set. Their DEA scores are calculated
per hospital by adding it to the benchmark set and solving
(1)–(3), however without requiring that their efficiency is
bounded by one. By consequence, the efficiency frontier is
not affected. The efficiency score of merging hospitals can
therefore exceed one. These methods present a small method-
ological innovation.
4 Data and variables
4.1 Data
Study data are obtained from two sources. The first source is
ZinData, which has provided financial and production data as
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available through public reporting. All Dutch hospitals are
obliged to report these data in fixed format in their annual
reports, which must be approved by accountants. Data are
available for the years 2005–2010. The second data source
was collected by IGZ and consists of quality measures. The
Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ) strives to promote public
health through effective enforcement of the quality of health
services, prevention measures and medical products. The IGZ
advises the responsible ministers and interacts with hospitals
by means of advice, encouragement, pressure and coercion.
IGZ has the task to ensure that health care providers offer only
‘responsible’ care and to be impartial. http://www.igz.nl/
english/ All Dutch hospitals obligatory report quality data to
IGZ, which reports the data to the public.We used data that are
available for the years 2005–2010 at the public website www.
ziekenhuizentransparant.nl.
4.2 DEA input measures
Frequently used input measures for DEA models can be
described by three main categories: capital investment,
labor, and other operating expenses [21]. More specifically,
the following four input measures are the most frequently
used: number of beds, operational expenses, FTE (full time
equivalent) physicians and FTE non-physicians. The mea-
sure Bnumber of beds^ of Dutch hospital as it is publicly
reported refers to the allowed number of clinical beds that a
hospital may operate. As this numbermay deviate substantially
from the actual number of beds, and the deviation varies per
hospital, we do not include number of beds in our study.
Hence, we use three input parameters: FTE employed by the
hospital (except physicians), FTE physicians, and the opera-
tional expenses.
In contrast to the parameters FTE and FTE physicians, the
operating expenses are influenced by inflation. This particu-
larly will influence the longitudinal analysis, as presented
through the Malmquist indices. Therefore, the operating ex-
penses for the period 2006–2010 are netted to the price level
of 2005. We discount using the official index figures for ma-
terial costs (without costs for workforce) of the Dutch
Healthcare Authority [12, 13]. Since the reform has been ini-
tiated, the regulations regarding valuation of assets have been
repeatedly and significantly adjusted for Dutch hospitals over
the period 2005–2010. These adjustments were made to ac-
count for changes in the reimbursement system for capital
costs, after which capital costs have ceased to be reimbursed
separately and the Dutch state is no longer involved in carry-
ing risks of capital costs. By consequence, the mandatory
reported balance sheet figures for fixed assets over the years
2005–2010 are inconsistent and therefore unfit to be consid-
ered as an input variable in the DEA models. On average,
capital costs account for less than 10 % of total costs [27].
4.3 DEA output measures
To be congruent with important parameters in the current
Dutch reimbursement system for hospitals and with many
other DEA studies (see e.g., [19] we consider as output mea-
sures: number of (inpatient) admissions, number of primary
outpatient visits and day care treatment. These numbers have
been a primary basis for reimbursement before 2005 and have
remained important afterwards.
4.4 Quality measures
Quality measures are adopted relatively recently compared to
financial and production-oriented measures. This has implica-
tions for the quality of the data supplied to the Dutch Ministry
of Health. Moreover, many definitions of quality indicators
have been adapted over time and many quality indicators have
disappeared or are replaced by others over the years 2005–
2010. The latter especially occurred when indicators are no
longer discriminating among hospitals. As a result, very few
outcome indicators have been consistently collected over the
period of analysis 2005–2010.
We have selected quality measures based upon the follow-
ing criteria:
& Available in all years (2005–2010)
& Indicator is measured correctly and uniformly within hos-
pitals and over the years considered
& The indicator addresses the hospital as a whole (as opposed
to a single unit or medical discipline).
Table 1 shows all IGZ quality measures and their appro-
priateness for inclusion. Given the impact of the system
change and the aim to improve quality it is remarkable that
only two hospital-wide quality measures have been consis-
tently collected since 2005: Prevalence of decubitus ulcers
and cancelled surgical operations (except cancellations by
patients). Both these quality indicators are ratios: the per-
centage of cancelled elective surgeries and the percentage
of inpatients having decubitus. Ratios as such cannot func-
tion as an input/output parameter in DEA [28]. A feasible
alternative for both ratios is to correct the output volumes,
by only counting as production the volume of surgeries that
have not been cancelled, or the volume of admissions,
which have not developed decubitus ulcers. As surgery
volume is not an output variable in our model, we cannot
correct for surgery cancellation, and thus further disregarded
this parameter. Hence, decubitus ulcers prevalence is the only
quality measure taken into account in our DEA analysis.
When taking it into account, we reduce the inpatient admis-
sion by the fraction of patients for which decubitus ulcers have
been reported.
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4.5 Exclusion of hospitals
University hospitals have been excluded from the study as
they form joint organizations with the medical faculties
and therefore have differences in input variables with the
general hospitals. Moreover, their objectives explicitly in-
clude research and education and therefore consider differ-
ent outcome variables as well. Finally, academic hospitals
function as tertiary hospitals and have a case-mix with a
considerably higher complexity. Specialty hospitals have
also been excluded.
Since we aim to study efficiency trends over 6 years,
we have excluded hospitals that do not report the manda-
tory data in all years. Table 2 presents a descriptive over-
view of all measures for the selected hospitals. As men-
tioned in the methods section, however, a separate analysis
is performed on excluded hospitals that have merged or
been acquired.
5 Results
We present the results following the sequence of analysis by
different models which firstly regard productivity. We then
include the sole quality parameter meeting the inclusion
criteria. We conclude by considering the efficiency of hospi-
tals which have merged or been acquired.
5.1 DEA constant returns to scale
Table 3 shows the DEA results per year for an input-oriented
constant return to scale model for the years 2005–2010 in
which quality is not taken into account. The average efficiency
is consistently at or slightly below 0,9 for 2005–2008, and
then declines to 0,87 in 2009 and 0,85 in 2010.
In the input oriented CRS DEA model results presented in
Table 3, the number of efficient hospitals declines from 15 in
2005 to 9 in 2010. At the same time we notice that the number
Table 1 IGZ quality indicators
selected scoring positive on the
three mentioned criteria








Is it a hospital
wide measure?
Inclusion (‘yes’
in each of the
previous columns)
Cancelled surgeries Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stroke No Yes No No
Decubitus ulcers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hip fracture Yes Yes No No
Intensive Care Yes No Yes No
Breast cancer No Yes No No
Pain after surgery Yes Yes No No
AMI Yes Yes No No
Blood transfusion No Yes Yes No
Cataract Yes No No No
Cholecystectomy Yes Yes No No
Complication registration Yes No Yes No
Diabetes Yes Yes No No
Heart failure Yes Yes No No
Pediatric surgery No Yes No No
Medication safety No No No No
Malnutrition No Yes Yes No
Unplanned reoperation No Yes No No
Post-operative wound Infection No No Yes No
High risk interventions No No No No
Hospital infections No No Yes No
ICT infrastructure No No Yes No
Pregnancy No Yes No No
Hospital standardized mortality
rate
No Yes Yes No
Unexpected extended length of
stay
No Yes Yes No
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of hospitals with relative efficiencies below 0,8 increase from
7 in 2005 to 23 in 2010.
Table 4 gives the Malmquist Indices for the year-to-year
development of efficiency. It shows small overall improve-
ments, except from 2009 until 2010. Notice that values of
greater than one for technological change indicate a small
but consistent development of the increased efficiency at the
frontier over the years. It is also worth considering the average
efficiency changes, which reflect the average distance to the
efficiency frontier. Table 4 confirms the finding of Table 3 that
the average relative efficiency decreases over the years 2009,
2010. In 2009, this is accompanied by an increased techno-
logical change, which is not the case for 2010.
Regarding research question 3, Table 5 presents results on
the reoccurrence of low efficiency scores over the years. It
shows that 10 of the 65 hospitals have efficiency score of 0,
8 or less in at least 4 of the years 2005–2010, while this is the
case for 4 hospitals in each of the reported years. These hos-
pitals account for around three quarters of the efficiency scores
less than 0,8 between 2005 and 2009, and form almost half of
the 23 hospitals with efficiency less than 0,8 in 2010. The
majority of hospitals always had efficiency above 0,8. The
recurrence frequency of having a score below 0,8 in subse-
quent years is 87 %.
5.2 DEA variable returns to scale
Table 6 presents the DEA results when using a VRS model
instead of a CRS model. One notices that the result displays
the same trend, yet that the average efficiency scores are now
about 0,05 higher. In particular, we notice that the number of
efficient hospitals has approximately doubled and is now
more stable until 2010. The number of hospitals with efficien-
cy scores of at most 0,8 is quite stable over the period 2005–
2010. When making this comparison, however, let it be noted
that the bounds of 0,9; 0,8 et cetera have not been adjusted for
changing the model.
Figure 1 presents linear regression plots of average effi-
ciency versus average total operating expenses over the years
2005–2010 for VRS and for CRS efficiency scores. It distin-
guishes the non-academic but ‘top clinical’ STZ hospitals
from the other ‘general’ hospitals (named SAZ in Fig. 1), as
STZ hospitals may have a different case mix. Figure 1 clearly
displays a scale effect by showing that larger hospitals are less
efficient by the negative correlation between VRS score and
scale and by the increasing differences in VRS and CRS
scores as a function of scale. Any case mix differences, which
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for
DEA variables for the included
Dutch hospitals (n=65) over
2005–2010
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Input
FTE (except physicians) 1520 807 408 4186
FTE Physicians 114 52 33 255
Operating expenses €43.158.768 €25.705.833 €10.468.000 €131.845.207
Output
Number of admissions 19.673 8582 6141 47.040
Number of day care treatments 18.844 9178 4702 52.411
First outpatient visits 114.197 47.258 37.574 255.948
Quality (n=59)
Percentage decubitus 4,3 2,4 0,0 15,1
Percentage decubitus 4,3 2,4 0,0 15,1
Table 3 DEA results with economic parameters only in an input-
oriented CRS model for Dutch hospitals (n=65)
Efficiency level 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1,0 15 15 12 12 13 9
≥0,9–<1,0 15 14 17 22 15 15
≥0,8–<0,9 28 24 27 24 21 18
≥0,7–<0,8 5 10 7 6 11 18
≥0,6–<0,7 2 2 2 1 5 5
≥0,5–<0,6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average efficiency 0,90 0,89 0,89 0,90 0,87 0,85
SD efficiency 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,10 0,11
Table 4 Malmquist Index with economic parameters only in an input-











Malmquist index 1,01 1,02 1,02 1,02 0,99
Efficiency change 0,99 1,00 1,01 0,96 0,97
Technology change 1,03 1,01 1,01 1,05 1,02
Malmquist index
standard deviation
0,05 0,05 0,07 0,06 0,07
Malmquist index –
minimum value
0,87 0,83 0,75 0,75 0,87
Malmquist index –
maximum value
1,13 1,11 1,15 1,08 1,36
Malmquist index –
maximum value
1,13 1,11 1,15 1,08 1,36
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may exist between STZ and non STZ hospitals, however, do
not translate to differences in efficiency between them.
5.3 Fixed proportion rate
Table 7 presents the results when using a FPR model. As the
model doesn’t allow scale effects or substitution between in-
puts, the average efficiency scores are lower than in the CRS
and VRS modeled presented above. We have calculated
paired samples statistics of the CRS and the FPR models
and found that they are highly (0,896) and significantly cor-
related. By definition, there is only one efficient hospital in
this analysis. Likewise, we notice that the number of hospitals
with a score of 0,9 or higher has decreased. Like the VRS
model, The FPRmodel finds that the average relative efficien-
cy decreases and that in 2010 there are more hospitals with
low efficiency scores.
5.4 Quality
Table 8 shows the results of incorporating decubitus ulcers as
a means of quality adjusted for the patient admissions output
parameter in the CRS-DEA model. The paired samples statis-
tics of the CRS with and without the adjustment for decubitus
are very close to 1 (0,989) and significant. Notice that the total
set of hospitals is not 65 but 59, as not all hospitals have
reported the quality data consistently over the years 2005–
2010. We observe that the number of efficient hospitals is
initially slightly higher yet decreases more than in the corre-
sponding model which doesn’t adjust for decubitus. Likewise,
the number of hospitals with scores of 0,9 or higher decreases
more sharply. The number of hospitals with scores of at most
0.8 now increases from 8 in 2005 to 22 in 2010. The average
relative efficiency decreases sharper than in the model with
adjustment.
5.5 Merged hospitals
Finally, we present the results required to the answer the sec-
ond part of research question 3, by considering the efficiency
scores of hospitals which have exited the regulated market
during the period of analysis 2005–2010. Recalling that each
of these hospitals has merged or was acquired, Table 9 pre-
sents analysis for the corresponding pairs of hospitals. Notice
that as discussed in the Methods section, efficiency scores
exceeding one do indeed occur. Hospital 6 was included in
the initial benchmark set. It is presented below because it
acquired Hospital-6A, however with very little impact on
efficiency.
We notice that of the hospitals which have merged only
hospital 3-B reported an efficiency of less than 0,8 for more
than 1 year prior to merger. Unfortunately, data for hospitals
2A, 2B, 5A, 5B, and 6A are missing for the years prior to
merger/take-over. We notice that in the 3 cases for which data
was available, the efficiency scores after the merger are lower
than the unweight average of the efficiency score before the
merger., In 2 out of 3 cases, the efficiency score after the
merger is less than the minimum score between the two hos-
pitals prior to merger. The efficiency of the other 3 pairs is less
than 0.8 after merger.
6 Conclusion
Lacking control group data, we cannot attribute any (absence
of) development in performance to be an effect of the reform.
Although 2005 can be viewed as a baseline, there is no data
which is truly from before the reform. Hence, before-after
analysis regarding before versus after reform performance dif-
ferences can neither be made. Our conclusions are simply
based on the various efficiency developments as observed
after the reform was introduced in 2005.
Regarding the first research question, we observe from
Table 3 that, until 2008, the relative average performance
has been stable at 0,90 while – as shown in Table 4 - the
technological efficiency slightly increased as the technologi-
cal efficiency shows small improvements of 1 or 2 %. For the
year 2009, the Malmquist analysis reveals a higher increase in
the technological change to 5 %, which drops back to a more
usual 2 % in 2010. 2010 is however the first year where the
Table 5 Frequencies of low













Table 6 DEA results with only economical parameters in an input-
oriented VRS model for Dutch hospitals (n=65)
Efficiency level 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1,0 27 26 29 28 29 21
≥0,9–<1,0 19 23 19 24 21 23
≥0,8–<0,9 17 14 16 11 11 17
≥0,7–<0,8 2 2 1 2 4 4
≥0,6–<0,7 0 0 0 0 0 0
≥0,5–<0,6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average efficiency 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,95 0,95 0,93
SD efficiency 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,07
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Malmquist index doesn’t show a positive average plus of
around 2 % improvement, but a small negative average
improvement.
To answer the second research question, the DEA analysis
presented in Table 3 shows that the relative average perfor-
mance decreased in 2009 and 2010 to 0,87 and 0,85 respec-
tively. As this average decrease has been accompanied by an
increase in technological change in 2009, the increase in tech-
nological improvement by the efficient hospitals explains
most of the larger efficiency differences. For 2010, the larger
differences are however not explained by increased techno-
logical improvement, and can therefore be considered to be
caused by decreases in efficiency of non-efficient hospitals.
The increased standard deviations of the efficiency scores in
2009 and 2010 confirm these conclusions.
These findings seem partly influenced by the choice of
model. The VRS model results display a more stable efficien-
cy development from 2005 to 2010. Average and standard
deviation of the efficiency scores remain by and large un-
changed, perhaps with a small decline in efficiency in 2010.
In combination with the results presented in Fig. 1, the CRS
and VRS results suggest that the efficiency gap between
smaller and larger hospital has grown larger in 2009 and
2010, and that the VRS parameters compensated for this
effect.
The FPR model provides results, which are comparable to
the DEA models. The FPR model displays a stable average
efficiency of around 0,8 which drops to 0,76 in 2010 while the
variance is stable around 0,1 throughout. This might indicate
that from a fixed proportion viewpoint, especially the most
efficient hospital improved in 2010, while the developments
have otherwise been quite stable.
Likewise, inclusion of the sole quality outcome parameter
that met the inclusion criteria (it regards decubitus ulcer prev-
alence) had only a marginal impact on the CRS results. The
results don’t provide evidence that inclusion of quality mea-
sures leads to added insights on performance developments.
However, this is mainly due to the definition and stability of
the available quality indicators.
Fig. 1 DEA scores versus
average total operating expense
over the years 2005–2010
Table 7 Fixed Proportion Ratio results with only economical parameters
for Dutch hospitals (n=65)
Efficiency level 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1,0 1 1 1 1 1 1
≥0,9–<1,0 13 10 7 13 10 4
≥0,8–<0,9 16 19 18 29 25 20
≥0,7–<0,8 26 22 28 15 18 25
≥0,6–<0,7 5 9 8 5 9 11
≥0,5–<0,6 4 4 3 2 2 4
Average efficiency 0,80 0,79 0,79 0,82 0,81 0,76
SD efficiency 0,10 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10
Table 8 DEA results where admissions have been adjusted for
decubitus ulcers in an input-oriented CRS model for Dutch hospitals
(n=59)
Efficiency level 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1,0 16 15 12 10 11 7
≥0,9–<1,0 15 12 18 20 13 12
≥0,8–<0,9 20 23 22 21 19 18
≥0,7–<0,8 6 7 5 7 11 18
≥0,6–<0,7 2 2 2 1 5 4
≥0,5–<0,6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average efficiency 0,90 0,90 0,89 0,90 0,86 0,84
SD efficiency 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,10
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With regard to the third research question, we find that
there are around 10 hospitals, which have consistently been
at least 20 % less efficient than the most efficient ones for the
majority of years in a 6 years period. Given the choice of
model and input variables this means that they have employed
20 % more physicians and/or staff and/or incurred 20 %
higher, other operating costs for the same level of output than
efficient counterparts. These 10 hospitals account for around
three quarter of such inefficiency until 2009. The conclusions
above indicate that several larger hospitals have joined these
less efficient performers in the years 2009 and 2010, after the
fraction of freely negotiable services increased to 33 % in
2008.
Our analysis provides no evidence that merger (take-over)
was related to lack of efficiency before the merger (take-over):
the average efficiency scores of the hospitals that have merged
have been between 0,89 and 0,96 over the years 2005–2008.
Conversely: the average efficiency scores after the merger or
acquisition have been between 0,62 and 0,74, placing the
resulting hospitals on average among the worst performing
hospitals from the benchmark set. The argument of selection
bias, which was a prime motivation to consider the merged
hospitals thus worked counter to our expectations.
7 Discussion
Before, providing a more general reflection, let us discuss the
methodological strengths and weaknesses of the presented
analysis and its consequences. As mentioned, the study design
inhibits attribution of effects to the reform. Nevertheless, we
can observe that the average efficiency of the hospitals has
been stable around 0,90 (CRS) or 0,95 (VRS) for the first
3 years after the reform in which the fraction of health
services for which prices have been freely negotiable was
around 10 %. In 2008, resp. 2009, this fraction increased
to 20 %, resp. 33 %, while the CRS average efficiency
change dropped from being very close to 1.00 to 0,96 and
0,97 respectively while the technological change increased
to 1,05 and 1,02. Our analysis has not revealed a consis-
tent relation between increases in market share of freely
negotiable health services and performance change in the
same year. Despite the methodological limitations, the
2009 and 2010 technology changes reported in Table 4,
in combination with Fig. 1, suggest the following. The
reform expanded the fraction for which prices and vol-
umes were freely negotiable. Some of the smaller hospitals
managed to achieve efficiency improvements intended by
the reform, whereas the efficiency changes reveal that
many larger hospitals typically did not.
No model will perfectly capture the efficiency and quality
developments of Dutch hospitals since 2005. Therefore, we
modeled these developments using a variety of models, and
although there is some variation in the results, they confirm
rather than contradict each other. Moreover, combining the
VRSwith the CRS results leads to additional insights. We also
notice that the results of the axiomatically different FPR
model are highly correlated with the CRS model results.
Table 9 DEA results for excluded hospitals, either merged or acquired, (CRS), excluded hospitals are benchmarked against included
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Merge Hospital-1 A 0,8333 0,8170 0,8296 0,7794
Hospital-1 B 0,7749 0,7697 0,8565 0,9143
Hospital-1 A+B 0,7384 0,7090
Merge Hospital-2 A na
Hospital-2 B na
Hospital-2 A+B 0,8282 0,8220 0,7585 0,6740 0,6258
Merge Hospital-3 A 1,0299 1,0939 1,1963 1,0670
Hospital-3 B 0,8262 0,7231 0,7643 0,7853
Hospital-3 A+B 0,5541 0,7682
Merge Hospital-4 A 1,1084 1,0211 1,0064 na
Hospital-4 B 1,0000 0,9484 1,1579 na
Hospital-4 A+B na 1,0312 0,8727
Merge Hospital-5 A na
Hospital-5 B na
Hospital-5 A+B na na na 0,7512 Na
Acquisition Hospital-6A na na na
Hospital-6 0,6243 0,6359 0,6582 0,6766 0,6828 0,6359
na = not available
M. van Ineveld et al.
In addition, we observe that the efficiency scores obtained
by including quality data are very closely correlated to the
initial CRS model efficiency scores.
Considering that the FPR model results displays the same
delay in the performance decrease as the VRSmodel, one may
suggest that the scale and substitution effects are interrelated.
Have smaller, efficient hospitals started to realize substitutions
in 2009, which larger hospitals didn’t realize?
As the model which includes quality by and large provides
the same results as the CRS model, it supports the viewpoint
that quality improvement and economic efficiency go hand in
hand (and doesn’t conform the viewpoint that more money
yields higher quality). Overall, the model triangulation in the
research design has strengthened and enriched the findings.
The results are based on using FTEs and operating costs as
inputs, while capital is not considered as an input due to in-
consistency of capital valuation regulations over the study
period. Although capital costs constitute less than 10 % of
total costs [27], inclusion of capital as a production factor is
worthy of future research. Regarding the quality, it has been
somewhat disappointing that only two outcome related quality
indicators have been consistently and reliably collected over
the years 2005–2010. In particular, since improving quality
has been an explicit objective of the reform. This objective
therefore appears to be difficult to evaluate for quality at the
hospital level.
The set of included hospitals is as nationwide and complete
as public reporting allows and considers 6 consecutive
years since the reform has been implemented in 2005.
Some bias may exist, as not all hospitals are included.
Some are excluded because they are academic hospitals
or specialty hospitals, others because they have not con-
sistently provided the legally due information. We have
explicitly addressed hospitals not selected in the bench-
mark because of mergers/take-overs.
Although the original closed budgeting system by which at
least two third of the average hospital budget was reimbursed
over the years 2005–2010 weighs production for different
medical specialties differently, case mix is not explicitly
accounted for in our study. One may argue that case mix
differences exist as some hospitals provide a more extensive
service product mix and/or treat more complex patients. The
top clinical hospitals (STZ) distinguish themselves from the
remaining hospitals by providing a broader product mix and
serving more complex patients. Figure 1 however doesn’t
confirm differences in case mix between STZ hospitals and
other hospitals to explain efficiency differences. On the other
hand, we cannot rule out a relationship between theses case
mix determinants and diminishing scale effects. More gener-
ally, we encourage further research explaining the relationship
between scale and case mix of Dutch hospitals. This topic is
relevant in the ongoing debate regarding the optimal numbers
of hospitals and patient volumes in The Netherlands.
The case-mix may not only vary across the hospitals, but
also over the years. The population has changed as life
expectancy has increased over the years 2005–2010.
Moreover, parallel reforms took place in primary care,
resulting in a shift in treatment for chronic diseases such
as Type 2 Diabetes. Thus, over the study period 2005–2010
a substitution took place from hospital care to primary.
Similarly, there have been innovations leading to substitu-
tion of care from the tertiary academic hospitals to the
general hospitals, and new more effective treatments prac-
tices have been adopted by the hospitals otherwise. The
performance developments as reported in our study don’t
include or correct for these contextual changes and techno-
logical advancements that the selected hospitals have dealt
with over the years 2005–2010.
The average input-oriented CRS DEA scores of around
or slightly below 0,9 are slightly higher than the average
(CRS and VRS) scores found for EU hospitals of 0,86 by
Hollingsworth [19], but slightly below the average of 0,91
reported by O Neill et al. [21]. The average input-oriented
VRS DEA score are considerably higher than both these
scores, despite the fact that the models use only 3 inputs
and 3 outputs. This suggests that the average efficiency of
Dutch hospitals (when benchmarked against each other)
over the benchmark period is quite high in comparison to
other European countries (when benchmarked within their
respective countries).
Although the research design inhibits attribution of the ef-
ficiency developments to the reform, the reduced average ef-
ficiency in the last 2 years are worthy to consider in relation to
the reform. On the one hand, one may argue that - counter to
the intention of the reform – hospitals which experience less
competition, e.g., for geographical reasons, became less effi-
cient when the regulated competition allowed them. An alter-
native viewpoint is that insurers continued the purchasing
practices, which were in place before the reform as even after
the reform was introduced prices and volumes were not freely
negotiated for the vast majority of services. Likewise hospital
management practices may have continued to be primarily
aligned with the system by which the majority of services
continued to be reimbursed. Therefore, the reform may not
have had a substantial impact on hospital efficiency until
2010, but rather initiated purchasing, management and
reporting changes as necessary for progression of the reform.
Progress is taking place as the fraction of services for which
prices and volumes can be freely negotiated has increased to
70 % by 2014 and insurers have implemented more selective
purchasing practices in recent years. Research regarding the
years 2011 onwards can shed further light on the develop-
ments as the reform progresses. Such further research may
also address the aforementioned geographical determinants
of competition, as well as differences in purchasing and man-
agement practices.
Productivity and quality of Dutch hospitals during system reform
This research project was financially supported by the NEVI Research
Foundation (NRS).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
References
1. Enthoven AC, van de Ven WPMM (2007) Going Dutch – managed
competition health insurance in the Netherlands. N Engl J Med 357:
2421–2423
2. Schut FT, Van de Ven WP (2005) Rationing and competition in the
Dutch health-care system. Health Econ 14:S59–S74
3. Schut FT, Van de VenWP (2011) Effects of purchaser competition in
the Dutch health system: is the glass half full or half empty? Health
Econ Policy Law 6:109–123
4. Tan SS, van Ineveld BM, Redekop WK, van RL H (2010) Structural
reforms and hospital payment in the Netherlands. EuroObserver 12:
7–9
5. Oostenbrink JB, Rutten FFH (2006) Cost assessment and price set-
ting of inpatient care in the Netherlands. The DBC case-mix system.
Health Care Manag Sci 9:287–294
6. Custers T, Onyebuchi AA, Klazinga NS (2007) Is there a business
case for quality in The Netherlands? A critical analysis of the recent
reforms of the health care system. Health Policy 82:226–239
7. Hibbard JH, Stockard J, Martin Tusler M (2005) Hospital perfor-
mance reports: impact on quality, market share, and reputation.
Health Aff 24:1150–1160
8. Blank J, Dumaij A, van Hulst B (2011) Ziekenhuismiddelen in
verband Een empirisch onderzoek naar productiviteit en
doelmatigheid in de Nederlandse ziekenhuizen (with English sum-
mary) 2003–2009. IPSE Studies TU Delft
9. Ludwig M, van Merode F, Groot W (2010) Principal agent relation-
ships and the efficiency of hospitals. Eur J Health Econ 11:291–304
10. Meijer S, Douven R, van den Berg B (2010) Recent developments in
Dutch hospitals: how does competition impact on inpatient care?
CPB Memorandum CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis
11. Bijlsma M, Koning P, Shestalova V, Aouragh A (2010) The effect of
competition on process and outcome quality of hospital care. An
empirical analysis for the Netherlands. CPB Discussion paper CPB
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
12. NZa (The Dutch Healthcare Authority) (2011) Marktscan Medisch
specialistische zorg Weergave van de markt 2006–2011. NZa
Utrecht
13. NZa (The Dutch Healthcare Authority) (2013) Marktscan Medisch
specialistische zorgWeergave van de markt 2008–2012. NZa Utrecht
14. Maniadakis N, Hollingsworth B, Thanassoulis E (1999) The impact
of the internal market on hospital efficiency, productivity and service
quality. Health Care Manag Sci 2:75–85
15. Sommersguter-ReichmannM (2000) The impact of the Austrian hos-
pital financing reform on hospital productivity: empirical evidence on
efficiency and technology changes using a non-parametric input-
based Malmquist approach. Health Care Manag Sci 3:309–321
16. Lobo MSC, Ozcan YA, Silva ACM, Lins MPE, Fiszman R (2010)
Financing reform and productivity change in brazilian teaching hos-
pitals: malmquist approach. CEJOR 18(2):141–152
17. Ozcan YA, Luke RD (2011) Healthcare delivery restructuring and
productivity change: assessing the Veterans Integrated Service
Networks (VISNs) using Malmquist approach. Med Care Res Rev
68(1 Suppl):20S–35S
18. Lindenauer PK, Remus D, Roman S, Rothberg MB, Benjamin EM,
Ma A, Bratzler DW (2007) Public reporting and pay for performance
in hospital quality improvement. N Engl J Med 356(5):486–496
19. Hollingsworth B (2008) The measurement of efficiency and produc-
tivity of health care delivery. Health Econ 17:1107–1128
20. Ozcan YA (2014) Health care benchmarking and performance eval-
uation, 2nd edn. Springer, New York
21. O’Neill L, Rauner M, Heidenberger K, Kraus M (2008) A cross-
national comparison and taxonomy of DEA-based hospital efficiency
studies. Socio Econ Plann Sci 42:158–189
22. Charnes A, Cooper WW, Rhodes E (1978) Measuring the efficiency
of decision making units. Eur J Oper Res 2:429–444
23. Dyson RG, Allen R, Camanho AS, Podinovski VV, Sarrico CS,
Shale EA (2001) Pitfalls and protocols in DEA. Eur J Oper Res
132:245–259
24. Barnum DT, Gleason JM (2011) Measuring efficiency under fixed
proportion technologies. J Prod Anal 35:243–262
25. Donabedian A (1988) The quality of care; how can it be assessed? J
Am Med Assoc 260(12):1743–1748
26. Jacobs R, Smith PC, Street A (2006) Measuring efficiency in health
care. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
27. BDO-Benchmark Ziekenhuizen 2012 (2012) www.bdo.nl/nl/
publicaties/documents
28. Mutter RL, Rosko MD, Greene WH, Wilson PW (2011) Translating
frontiers into practice: taking the next steps toward improving hospi-
tal efficiency. Med Care Res Rev 68:3–19S
M. van Ineveld et al.
